Judicial Pronouncement, Public Mischief, and the Contemptuous Campaign Against Vantara

By Gajanan Khergamker

The order of the Supreme Court of India dated 25 August 2025 in C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India & Ors. is as much an exercise in constitutional prudence as it is a reaffirmation of judicial restraint. The Court, faced with a spate of public interest litigations premised almost entirely on media reportage, social media chatter, and complaints of non-governmental organisations, chose not to dismiss the petitions in limine — which it would have been well within its powers to do — but instead directed the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to conduct an independent fact-finding inquiry.

Image for representational purpose only

Yet, in crafting this delicate balance, the Court was unambiguous: the constitution of the SIT “neither expresses any opinion on the allegations” nor should it be construed as casting doubt upon the functioning of Vantara or of statutory authorities. The SIT was intended to act merely as a neutral tool of ascertainment — not an imprimatur of suspicion.

Despite such clarity, the aftermath has witnessed what may aptly be described as a mischievous campaign of vilification. Media outlets, activist quarters, and social media platforms have spun narratives imputing culpability to Vantara, portraying the very constitution of the SIT as evidence of judicial acknowledgement of wrongdoing.

In law, this constitutes a classic case of contempt of court. Article 129 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the power to punish for contempt, while the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 demarcates two species — civil and criminal. The present mischief falls squarely within the realm of criminal contempt, for it scandalises the Court, lowers its authority, and prejudices or tends to prejudice the judicial process.

Indian jurisprudence on contempt has repeatedly wrestled with the tension between free expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the majesty of the judiciary. In Arundhati Roy v. State of Delhi (2002), the Supreme Court did not hesitate to convict the author for imputations that questioned the integrity of the judicial institution. The principle distilled therefrom is that while criticism of judgments is permissible, misrepresentation of judicial orders to create a public frenzy of prejudice is not.

Similarly, in Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie (2014), the Court clarified that bona fide criticism rooted in reasoned argument is protected, but statements tending to erode public confidence in pending judicial proceedings attract contempt. The present vitriol against Vantara, which twists the Court’s carefully worded neutrality into an alleged admission of guilt, is of precisely this character.

Here, the Court’s direction was tethered entirely to procedural fairness — to ascertain facts in the wake of sweeping accusations unsupported by probative material. Yet, mischief-mongers have chosen to weaponise this act of restraint, broadcasting it as an indictment of Vantara. This not only mischaracterises the Court’s intention but also imperils the principle of presumption of innocence, a cornerstone of Article 21.

Such conduct is not merely defamatory of Vantara but contemptuous of the Court itself. It places pressure on the SIT to operate under the shadow of public suspicion, thereby prejudicing the very inquiry that the Court sought to keep impartial. It also undermines the judiciary’s institutional credibility by portraying its neutral processes as adversarial in nature.

Globally, courts have recognised the pernicious effect of media trials and public campaigns on judicial proceedings. The House of Lords in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1974) underscored that comment calculated to interfere with the course of justice is contempt irrespective of motive. The Indian Supreme Court’s warning in this case mirrors that approach, for it expressly cautioned that non-cooperation with the SIT could invite contempt proceedings.

The vilification of Vantara is thus not a localised aberration but part of a broader international malaise where judicial restraint is hijacked by media sensationalism. The distinction, however, is that in India, contempt jurisdiction is constitutionally entrenched, enabling the Court to wield a more robust corrective.

The continuing vilification of Vantara, despite judicial clarity, exemplifies a pernicious form of contempt — one that thrives on distorting neutrality into suspicion. The law demands that the dignity of the Court and the fairness of its processes be shielded from such public mischief.

If unchecked, this campaign not only prejudices Vantara’s rights but also corrodes faith in judicial neutrality itself. The Supreme Court, constitutionally armed under Article 129, would be well within its powers to censure such conduct and, if necessary, proceed against errant voices for criminal contempt.

For, ultimately, the majesty of justice cannot be held hostage to the venom of mischief-mongers.